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Feasibility Study of UAV-Assisted Anti-Jamming
Positioning
Zijie Wang, Rongke Liu, Senior Member, IEEE, Qirui Liu, Lincong Han, and John S. Thompson, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—As the cost and technical difficulty of jamming
devices continue to decrease, jamming has become one of
the major threats to positioning service. Unfortunately, most
conventional wireless positioning technologies are vulnerable to
jamming attacks due to inherent shortcomings like weak signal
strength and unfavorable anchor geometry. Thanks to their high
operational flexibility, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could
be a promising solution to the above challenges. Therefore, in
this article, we propose a UAV-assisted anti-jamming positioning
system, in which multiple UAVs first utilize time-difference-of-
arrival (TDoA) measurements from ground reference stations
and double-response two-way ranging (DR-TWR) measurements
from UAV-to-UAV links to perform self-localization as well as
clock synchronization, and then act as anchor nodes to provide
TDoA positioning service for ground users in the presence
of jamming. To evaluate the feasibility and performance of
the proposed system, we first derive the Cramér-Rao lower
bound (CRLB) of UAV self-localization. Then, the impacts of
UAV position uncertainty and synchronization errors caused by
jamming on positioning service are modeled, and the theoretical
root-mean-square error (RMSE) of user position estimate is
further derived. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
system is a promising alternative to existing positioning systems
when their services are disrupted by jamming. The most notable
advantage of the proposed system is that it is fully compatible
with existing user equipment terminals and positioning methods.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), anti-jamming




AS people’s demand for accurate location information con-tinues to increase, positioning technologies are playing
an increasingly important role in today’s society [1]. The use
of positioning technologies enables a wide range of location-
based services (LBS) like intelligent transport systems (ITS)
and mobile marketing [2], [3], thereby promoting new de-
velopments of industrial manufacturing and our daily lives.
To this end, both the fifth generation (5G) wireless networks
currently under construction and the future sixth generation
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(6G) networks have regarded positioning as a key technology
and an essential service [4], [5]. Despite the above advantages,
in practical applications, the availability and performance of
positioning service can be severely affected by many factors,
and jamming is one of them.
Generally speaking, jamming refers to a type of intentional
radio frequency interference (RFI) emitted by hostile devices
(also known as “jammer”), whose aim is to block the posi-
tioning service or degrade accuracy by disturbing the signal
reception at the user equipment (UE) [6]. Due to the rapid
development of the electronics industry in recent years, the
cost and technical difficulty of jamming continue to decrease.
A portable jammer could be easily obtained over the internet
for less than 100 dollars [7]. Over the past five years, hundreds
of jamming incidents have been reported around the world [8].
The frequent occurrence of jamming incidents poses serious
threats to life-critical applications such as traffic management
and emergency services.
Unfortunately, conventional wireless positioning technolo-
gies represented by global navigation satellite system (GNSS)
and terrestrial cellular-based positioning are vulnerable to
jamming attacks [9]. For the widely used GNSS systems,
their services cover almost all regions of the world and could
achieve centimeter-level accuracy with high-end equipment in
open-sky environments [10], [11]. However, the positioning
services provided by GNSS rely on satellites operating in orbit
at altitudes ranging from 19 to 35 thousand km [12]. The
long-distance propagation makes the strength of GNSS signals
received at earth’s surface extremely weak (only about -133 to
-122dBm), which could be easily overwhelmed by jamming
signals. In practical applications, a low-cost jammer with
transmit power of 10dBm can disrupt all GNSS services within
a radius of 100m [13]. Although many existing studies showed
that the performance of GNSS receivers in jamming environ-
ments could be improved by adopting novel antennas or high-
performance filters [14]–[16], these approaches do not change
the weak signal strength, resulting in limited improvement in
anti-jamming ability. Moreover, these approaches commonly
require changes to the receiver’s hardware or software, which
means that they are cost-consuming and incompatible with
existing equipment. In terms of the terrestrial cellular-based
positioning, it has the ability to provide services for users in
some GNSS degraded environments such as dense urban and
indoors [17], [18]. Nevertheless, similar to GNSS systems,
cellular-based positioning also has its own limitations. Since
cellular networks are originally designed for communication
applications that only require connection with one base station
(BS), it is very difficult for users to find a sufficient number
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of BSs for positioning [19]. Even if the user could receive
signals from multiple BSs, some of them may be far away
from the user, resulting in weak signals that are vulnerable to
jamming attacks [20]. In addition, the geometry of terrestrial
BSs is commonly unsuitable for positioning [21], which leads
to large position errors even under normal conditions. Thus,
the terrestrial cellular-based positioning system is likely to
degrade further in the presence of jamming.
Due to the high operational flexibility and controlled mobili-
ty, low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have recently
attracted increasing attention from the research community.
UAVs are expected to bring a new paradigm for the design of
wireless networks [22]. In the field of communication, UAVs
have been studied for their ability to act as aerial BSs and
relays to serve the ground users or coordinate with terrestrial
networks [23]. For example, Zhou et al. [24], [25] designed
a novel UAV-enabled mobile edge computing (MEC) system
that innovatively uses UAV platform to provide computation
offloading services with satisfactory security and latency for
ground users. It is noteworthy that UAVs are also suitable for
being employed as aerial anchor nodes to provide positioning
services [26], especially in jamming environments. Compared
with satellites and BSs, UAVs are capable of flying close to
users, to enhance the received signal strength [27]. Besides,
through the optimization of UAV deployment, users could easi-
ly establish connections with multiple UAVs, whose geometry
could be adjusted flexibly according to users’ requirements.
Therefore, it is very promising to utilize both low-altitude
UAVs and the existing terrestrial infrastructure to develop a
novel anti-jamming positioning system. The aim of this study
is to design such a system and evaluate its feasibility.
B. Related Work
Due to the aforementioned advantages, UAV-enabled posi-
tioning has become a hot topic for research in recent years.
The concept of using UAVs as mobile anchor nodes to locate
ground users and the corresponding positioning methods were
introduced in [28], [29]. In [30], [31], two UAV-enabled
positioning prototypes called HAWK and GuideLoc were
proposed, which employ range-free approaches to obtain rough
estimates of user’s location. Sallouha et al. [32], [33] and
Wang et al. [34] applied the received signal strength (RSS)-
based and time-difference-of-arrival (TDoA) approaches to
UAV-enabled positioning to improve the accuracy of location
estimation. In [35], authors performed an exhaustive survey
of the positioning methods used in UAV surveillance systems,
and discussed their pros and cons in detail. Furthermore, the
service reliability of UAV-enabled positioning in mountainous
environments was analyzed and enhanced in [36]. However,
none of the above studies considered the impacts of jamming
on positioning services, which renders these systems unre-
liable. In [37], a UAV swarm was employed to locate and
track intermittent RF sources like jammers. Nevertheless, this
research mainly focuses on the localization of jammers, rather
than positioning services for users in jamming environments.
In addition, most existing systems rely on GNSS systems to
obtain the UAVs’ locations, which is unrealistic in jamming
environments [13]. In [38], ground reference stations (GRSs)
with known positions were used to locate UAVs, which is a
potential solution to the problem of UAV self-localization in
GNSS-denied environments. Nevertheless, jamming was still
not taken into account in this research.
In most existing research on UAV-enabled positioning, the
UAV’s location information is commonly assumed to be per-
fectly known [32], [34]. In practice, the self-localization and
clock synchronization of UAVs rely on measurements provided
by satellites, GRSs or other UAVs [38], [39], which will also
be inaccurate under jamming attacks. Therefore, in addition to
affecting the positioning services for users, jamming will also
cause anchor position and clock uncertainty in UAV-enabled
positioning systems. The impact of anchor position uncertainty
on RSS-based positioning systems was analyzed with Cramér-
Rao lower bound (CRLB) in [40]. In [41] and [42], the CRLBs
of time-of-arrival (ToA) and TDoA positioning in the presence
of anchor position uncertainty were derived. The lower bound
on performance in these studies can be approached by the well-
known maximum-likelihood (ML) method, which is time-
consuming and compute-intensive. The mean-square error
(MSE) of the iterative least-squares (ILS) method derived in
[43] seems to be a better metric for evaluating the position
accuracy of users with low-cost equipment. However, in [43],
anchor nodes were assumed to be perfectly synchronized,
which may not be reasonable in multi-UAV systems. Thus,
to evaluate objectively the performance of a UAV-enabled
positioning system in jamming environments, both the anchor
position uncertainty and clock uncertainty should be taken into
consideration.
C. Main Contributions
In this article, we propose a UAV-assisted anti-jamming
positioning system consisting of multiple low-altitude UAV
platforms and GRSs to provide positioning services for users
in jamming environments, and theoretically analyze its perfor-
mance. The proposed system takes full advantages of the high
mobility and flexible aerial deployment of UAVs to improve
the anti-jamming performance of positioning services. This
can be achieved without using complex algorithms or changing
hardware, making it fully compatible with existing low-cost
equipment. Specifically, the main contributions of this article
are summarized as follows.
• We establish a practical scenario in which both the UAV
and ground user are affected by jamming. Compared
with previous research, this scenario is more suitable for
evaluating the anti-jamming performance of UAV-enabled
positioning systems.
• We study the problem of UAV self-localization and
clock synchronization, which has been neglected by many
existing papers. A hybrid TDoA/double-response two-
way ranging (DR-TWR) scheme is proposed to solve this
problem, and the CRLB of UAV self-localization in the
presence of jamming is derived.
• We use the TDoA measurements provided by UAVs
and ILS method to locate users. The impact of UAV
position and clock uncertainty on the positioning service











Fig. 1. Proposed UAV-assisted anti-jamming positioning system.
is analyzed, and the theoretical root-mean-square error
(RMSE) of user position estimate is derived. Compared
with metrics used in existing research, RMSE is more
appropriate for describing the position accuracy of low-
cost UE in UAV-enabled positioning systems.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The
structure of the proposed system and the positioning methods
used are given in Section II. Section III derives the CRLB of
UAV self-localization and the RMSE of UE position estimate
in jamming environments. Section IV provides numerical re-
sults to demonstrate the feasibility and validity of our proposed
system. Finally, Section V concludes this article.
The main notations used in this article are summarized
as follows. Scalars are denoted by italic letters (a). Column
vectors and matrices are denoted by lowercase and uppercase
boldface letters (a and A), respectively. The superscript T
indicates the transpose operation (AT ) and superscript −1
indicates matrix inverse (A−1). ‖·‖ represents the Euclidean
norm of a vector.
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
In this article, as shown in Fig. 1, we consider a scenario
consisting of a portable jammer, M mobile GRSs and N
low-altitude UAV platforms. GRSs and UAVs are denoted by
sets G ∆= {G1, G2, · · · , GM} and V
∆
= {V1, V2, · · · , VN},
respectively. The location of the jammer has been accurately
measured in advance and is denoted by the horizontal coor-
dinates w = (xJ , yJ)
T ∈ R2×1 and height hJ . Its three-





The jammer continuously emits noise-like jamming signals in
GNSS and 2.4 GHz ISM bands, blocking the reception of
all GNSS signals within RJ meters around it. This circular
area in which GNSS services are completely disrupted is
called the “jamming area”, whose boundary is indicated by
the brown solid line in Fig. 1. In addition, it is assumed that
the jammer has the ability to identify and track the frequency
of positioning signals, so that the jamming cannot be mitigated
by transmitting signals at different frequencies. The transmit
power of the jammer in the ISM band is denoted by P tJ .
A mobile GRS could be an autonomous land vehicle (ALV)
equipped with a high-end GNSS receiver as well as an
ISM band transceiver. The former is used to determine the
GRS’s own location, while the latter is used for providing
positioning services. In order to receive GNSS signals and
locate itself, each GRS must stay at least RJ meters away
from the jammer, that is, outside the jamming area. Moreover,
we assume that if this requirement is satisfied, the impact
of jamming on GRSs’ position accuracy can be effectively
mitigated. The location of the m-th GRS (Gm) is denoted
by the horizontal coordinates gm = (xmG , y
m
G )
T ∈ R2×1 and




). P tG is the transmit power
of its ISM band transceiver.
UEs that are denied positioning services due to jamming
are located in a square area called the “target area”, which is
marked in grey in Fig. 1. The center and side length of the tar-
get area are denoted by oT and LT , respectively. It is assumed
that UEs are uniformly distributed within the target area. The











is the average height of handheld devices. As can be seen from
Fig. 1, the target area is inside the jamming area, which means
that UEs cannot use GNSS systems to locate themselves. As
mentioned above, GRSs have to stay outside the jamming
area, which means they are further away from UEs. Thus,
the probability that LoS paths exist between GRSs and UEs is
extremely low. Moreover, in order to maintain the connection
with the controller, GRSs are commonly not far apart, resulting
in an unfavorable geometry for positioning. From the above
analysis, it can be concluded that GRSs are also unsuitable for
providing positioning services for UEs in the target area.
In order to meet UEs’ requirements for positioning services,
we introduce UAVs into this scenario and form a novel anti-
jamming positioning system together with the existing GRSs.
Similar to UEs, UAVs hovering at a fixed altitude hV over the
jamming area cannot use GNSS systems to determine their
own locations. Compared with weak GNSS signals, the ISM
band signals transmitted by low-altitude or ground platforms
at higher power are less likely to be overwhelmed by jamming
signals. Thus, each UAV is equipped with an ISM band
transceiver, which will be used to establish wireless links with
the GRSs, other UAVs and UEs for self-localization as well
as providing positioning services. The true location of the n-











The transmit power of its ISM band transceiver is denoted
by P tV . In the proposed system, the UAVs first utilize the
measurements obtained from GRS-to-UAV (G2V) and UAV-
to-UAV (V2V) links to perform self-localization and clock
synchronization. After their own locations are determined,
these UAVs will be used as anchor nodes to provide posi-
tioning services for UEs through UAV-to-UE (V2U) links.
Both the UAV self-localization process and service process are
affected by jamming. Since UAVs can move close to UEs and
maintain a satisfactory geometry for positioning, the proposed
system is expected to achieve good anti-jamming performance.
A. Hybrid TDoA/DR-TWR UAV Self-Localization
As shown in Fig. 1, in the proposed system, each UAV
Vn could use its ISM band transceiver to establish M G2V



























Fig. 2. Model of UAV self-localization.
measurement links and (N − 1) V2V measurement links.
Moreover, there is also a Jammer-to-UAV (J2V) jamming link
between the jammer and each UAV. These three kinds of
wireless links can be characterized with two types of channels,
namely the Ground-to-Air (G2A) channel and the Air-to-Air
(A2A) channel. The former includes the G2V and J2V links,
while the V2V links belong to the latter. The G2V links are
assumed to be dominated by LoS components. This assump-
tion is quite reasonable because the high altitude of UAVs
commonly leads to a high probability of LoS propagation [44],
[45]. Then, the average path loss between GRS Gm and UAV
Vn can be expressed as
PLGm→Vn = β0






is the reference path loss at a distance
of 1m; fc and c are the main frequency of the ISM band
transceiver (2.4GHz) and the speed of light, respectively. αLG2A
is the path loss exponent (PLE) of the G2A channel under LoS
conditions.
Moreover, we also assume that there are always clear LoS
paths between UAVs [46]. Therefore, the path loss between
UAV Vn and Vi follows the free space propagation model and
can be written as
PLVi→Vn = β0
(∥∥v∗n.3D − v∗i,3D∥∥)2. (2)
Different from G2V links, the propagation condition of the
J2V link could be either LoS or NLoS. The NLoS condition
occurs when the UAV chooses to hide behind obstructions like
buildings or mountains to reduce the impact of jamming on
its signal reception. Then, the average path loss between the
jammer and UAV Vn can be expressed as
PLJ→Vn = β0
(∥∥v∗n,3D −w3D∥∥)αXG2A , (3)
where the superscript X of αXG2A is either L or N, indicating
the propagation condition (LoS or NLoS). Please note that
the small-scale channel fading is not considered in the above
equation because it can be averaged out using positioning
signals with large frame length [47], [48].
The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratios (SINR) of the
positioning signals transmitted by GRS Gm and UAV Vi at













where Pn0 is the noise power. As described in [49], the
minimum variances of ToA measurements that UAV Vn could



















where B is the signal bandwidth. As shown in Fig. 2, UAVs
utilize two types of measurements to estimate their own
locations, one of which is the TDoA measurement obtained
through G2V links. Since GRSs have been accurately syn-
chronized with each other using GNSS systems, measuring the
TDoA between a pair of GRSs could eliminate the unknown
clock bias between GRSs and the UAV. Let GRS G1 be the
reference node, the TDoA measurement of GRS pair 〈Gm, G1〉
measured at UAV Vn can be expressed as
dGm,G1→Vn =
∥∥v∗n,3D−gm,3D∥∥−∥∥v∗n,3D−g1,3D∥∥+nGm,G1→Vn
= r∗Gm→Vn − r
∗
G1→Vn + nGm,G1→Vn
= d∗Gm,G1→Vn + nGm,G1→Vn ,
(8)
where d∗Gm,G1→Vn denotes the true TDoA of the GRS
pair 〈Gm, G1〉; r∗Gm→Vn (r
∗
G1→Vn ) is the true distance
between GRS Gm (G1) and UAV Vn; nGm,G1→Vn ∼
N
(




is the TDoA measurement error
caused by transceiver’s internal noise and jamming.
Through G2V links, each UAV Vn could collect (M − 1)
TDoA measurements, which can be represented by the follow-
ing vector:
dG→Vn = [dG2,G1→Vn , · · · , dGM ,G1→Vn ]
T
= d∗G→Vn + nG→Vn ,
(9)
where the vector d∗G→Vn =
[




denotes the true values of the (M − 1) TDoA measurements,
and nG→Vn = [nG2,G1→Vn , · · · , nGM ,G1→Vn ]
T is the vector
of measurement errors. The total TDoA measurements collect-
ed by N UAVs form the following N (M − 1)× 1 vector:
dG→V =
[



















The other type of measurements for UAV self-localization
is the range measurement obtained with DR-TWR technique
through V2V links. DR-TWR technique can ease the con-
straint of clock synchronization through the exchange of
messages [50], making it suitable for measuring the range
between two UAVs before they are synchronized. As shown
in Appendix A, the DR-TWR measurement corresponding to




Vn→Vi +nVn→Vi = ‖v
∗
n−v∗i ‖+nVn→Vi , (11)
where r∗Vn→Vi denotes the true range between UAV Vn and










is the total range
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= {1, · · · , n− 1, n+ 1, · · · , N}, and Ln,i repre-
sents the i-th element in set Ln. Then, the (N − 1) DR-TWR




rVn→VLn,1 , · · · , rVn→VLn,N−1
]T
= r∗Vn→V + nVn→V ,
(12)










is the vector of measurement
errors. The total N×(N − 1) range measurements obtained
by the N UAVs form the following vector:
rV→V =
[




=r∗V→V + nV→V . (13)
Putting the measurement vectors dG→V and rV→V togeth-
er, the total N × (M +N − 2) measurements obtained by






















The parameters to be estimated in the UAV self-localization










V , · · · , xNV , yNV
]T
. (15)
In the proposed system, UAVs send all their measurements
(oV ) to GRS G1, which will use the well-known ML method
to estimate UAVs’ locations (v). The estimated locations are
denoted by vector v̂ =
[
v̂T1 , · · · , v̂TN
]T
.
B. Clock Synchronization between UAVs
To be employed as anchor nodes for TDoA positioning,
UAVs need to be clock synchronized. In the proposed system,
the local clock of GRS G1 that has already been synchronized
with GNSS is treated as the reference clock for timing
services. During the mission, GRS G1 periodically sends
synchronization messages with timestamps to UAVs. The
synchronization message sent at time ts will be detected by
UAV Vn at time










error (m) caused by transceiver’s internal noise and jamming.
For UAV Vn, the transmission time ts of the synchronization
message can be extracted from the received timestamp, while
the true range r∗G1→Vn is unavailable. Replacing r
∗
G1→Vn in
equation (16) with the predicted range r̂G1→Vn based on the





result at UAV Vn can be expressed as



















Fig. 3. Model of UE Positioning.
Then, the clock synchronization error (m) corresponding to







∥∥v∗n,3D − g1,3D∥∥+eG1→Vn . (18)
It can be clearly seen from the above equation that the clock
synchronization error consists of two components, that is, the
range prediction error caused by UAV position uncertainty
and the ToA measurement error caused by internal noise and
jamming.
C. TDoA Positioning Services for UE
After their time and locations are determined by the schemes
introduced in the previous subsections, UAVs in the proposed
system will be used as anchor nodes to provide positioning
services for UEs. As shown in Fig. 1, each UE could receive
positioning signals from UAVs through N UAV-to-UE (V2U)
measurement links. Similar to UAVs, the signal reception at
the UE is also affected by the Jammer-to-UE (J2U) jamming
link. The V2U links can be modeled as G2A channels, and
their propagation conditions are assumed to be LoS [45]. Thus,
the average path loss PLVn→U between the UE and UAV Vn
can be calculated by replacing gm,3D in equation (1) with
u∗3D. The J2U jamming link is a typical Ground-to-Ground
(G2G) channel. Since the jammer is close to the UE, the J2U
link is assumed to be dominated by the LoS component [21],
and its average path loss can be expressed as
PLJ→U = β0(‖u∗3D −w3D‖)
αLG2G , (19)
where αLG2G denotes the PLE of the G2G channel under
LoS conditions. Then, the SINR (SINRVn→U ) and ToA
measurement variance (σ2Vn→U ) at the UE can be calculated
with approaches similar to equations (4) and (6).
As shown in Fig. 3, we use the TDoA technique to support
positioning services. The reason for choosing TDoA is that this
technique has been widely adopted in many existing systems
such as the Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, so that
the services provided by the proposed system can be fully
compatible with existing equipment. Let UAV V1 be the refer-
ence node, the TDoA measurement of the UAV pair 〈Vn, V1〉
measured at the UE can be written as equation (20), where
















JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 6
dVn,V1→U =














Vn,V1→U + nVn,V1→U .
(20)
indicate the impacts of clock synchronization errors caused
by UAV position uncertainty and jamming on the TDoA mea-







the measurement error caused by UE’s internal noise and
jamming.
The UE could collect (N − 1) TDoA measurements through
V2U links, which can be represented by the following vector:
dV→U = [dV2,V1→U , · · · , dVN ,V1→U ]
T
























nV→U = [nV2,V1→U , · · · , nVN ,V1→U ]
T
. (25)
After collecting all the TDoA measurements in vector
dV→U , the horizontal coordinates (u = [xU , yU ]
T ) of the UE
could be estimated with the widely used ILS method. The
estimated UE location is denoted by vector û = [x̂U , ŷU ]
T .
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
In this section, we evaluate the theoretical performance of
the proposed system under jamming attacks. Different from
previous studies in which the UAVs’ locations are assumed
to be perfectly known [32], [34], we consider the impacts of
jamming on both UAV self-localization and UE position esti-
mation, making the evaluation results more practical. Specifi-
cally, the CRLB of the proposed hybrid TDoA/DR-TWR UAV
self-localization scheme is first derived in subsection A. Then,
in subsection B, we derive the RMSE of UE position estimate
in the presence of UAV position and clock uncertainty. Finally,
in subsection C, we analyze some other performance metrics
that need to be considered in real-world applications.
A. CRLB of UAV Self-Localization
As mentioned in Section II.A, during the UAV self-
localization process, GRS G1 with sufficient computation
power will use the ML method to determine periodically the
UAVs’ locations. Thus, the CRLB that could be approached
by ML method is used to indicate the theoretical performance
of UAV self-localization in the presence of jamming. Since
the TDoA vector dG→V and DR-TWR vector rV→V are
independent of each other, the log-likelihood function of the
measurement vector oV can be expressed as
ln f (oV ; v) = ln f (dG→V ; v) + ln f (rV→V ; v) , (26)
where f (dG→V ; v) and f (rV→V ; v) are likelihood functions
of TDoA measurements and DR-TWR measurements, respec-
tively. The expressions of f (dG→V ; v) and f (rV→V ; v) are




































where QnG→V and QnV→V are the covariance matrices of
TDoA error vector nG→V and DR-TWR error vector nV→V ,




























and IM−1 denotes the (M − 1)× (M − 1) identity matrix.
Then, the CRLB for UAV location estimation can be calcu-
lated using the following equation:
CRLB (v) = −E
[





∂2 ln f (dG→V ; v)
∂v∂vT
+
































where JTDoAG→V and J
DR−TWR
V→V are Fisher information matrices
(FIM) corresponding to G2V TDoA measurements and V2V
DR-TWR measurements, respectively. It can be clearly seen
from the above equation that the CRLB is the inverse of
the sum of FIM JTDoAG→V and J
DR−TWR
V→V , which reflects the






































, if Ln,i ≥ n,
(38)




∂v in equation (33) is the partial derivative
of TDoA measurements with respect to the UAVs’ locations,
which can be expressed as
∂d∗G→V
∂v
= blkdiag (D1,D2, · · · ,DN ) , (34)
where Dn is a (M − 1)× 2 matrix, whose expression can
be written as (1 ≤ i ≤M − 1)


















(v∗n − gm)∥∥∥v∗n,3D − gm,3D∥∥∥ . (36)
Similarly, the partial derivative ∂r
∗
V→V
∂v of the DR-TWR mea-























We assume that the UAV self-localization performed at the
GRS G1 could approach the CRLB. Then, the covariance


















B. RMSE of UE Position Estimation
As described in Section II.C, the UE uses the ILS method
to determine its own location. Since the position and clock
uncertainty of UAVs are unknown, the UE can only use the
following measurement equations for position estimation:
d̄V→U (u) =
[
d̄V2,V1→U (u) , · · · , d̄VN ,V1→U (u)
]T
, (41)






The ILS method estimates the UE’s location in an it-











) denote the location
estimate obtained in the k-th iteration, the first-order Taylor-
series expansion of d̄V→U (u) at ûk can be expressed as































is the Jacobian matrix of measurement equations at ûk, and
kûkv∗n =
(ûk − v∗n)∥∥∥ûk,3D − v∗n,3D∥∥∥ . (45)
Noted that in equation (44), the estimated locations (v̂n) of
UAVs are replaced by the corresponding true values (v∗n). The
explanation for this operation is explained in [43].
Then, the least-squares estimate of the UE’s location ob-
















Replacing ûk in the above equation with the UE’s true location
u∗, the estimation error of the ILS method after convergence
can be written as

















QnV→U denotes the covariance matrix of the noise term nV→U














in equation (47). The difference between the measured TDoA
dVn,V1→U and the TDoA value d̄Vn,V1→U (u
∗) that is predict-






−∆tNoiVn,V1→U + nVn,V1→U )
− (‖u∗3D−v̂n,3D‖ − ‖u∗3D−v̂1,3D‖) ,
(51)
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Expanding the term ‖v̂n,3D − g1,3D‖ at v∗n,3D based on the






∥∥v∗n,3D−g1,3D∥∥+ (kv∗ng1 )T∆vn. (53)






































































can be expressed as
dV→U−d̄V→U (u∗) = KV→U∆v−∆tNoiV→U+nV→U , (57)
where KV→U is a (N − 1) × 2N matrix and its expression
can be written as (1 ≤ i ≤ N − 1)

























With equations (47) and (57), the covariance matrix of the




































Finally, the RMSE of UE position estimate can be calculated
as follows:
RMSE (u) = trace(Q∆u)
1
2 . (61)
As can be seen from equation (59), the covariance
matrix Q∆u is the sum of two terms. The first term
(P (u∗)) represents the UE position error under ideal con-
ditions where UAVs’ locations are perfectly known and








T ) reflects the im-
pacts of UAV position uncertainty and synchronization errors
caused by noise and jamming on position accuracy.
C. Other Performance Metrics
With the expressions derived in the above two subsections,
we can quantitatively evaluate the accuracy of the UAV self-
localization and UE position estimation in jamming environ-
ments. Although the position accuracy is the major concern in
this article, it is still not sufficient to comprehensively evaluate
the quality of positioning services. In order to demonstrate the
feasibility and practicability of the proposed system in real-
world applications, it is necessary to evaluate and analyze
some other performance metrics of the positioning service.
Thus, in this subsection, we discuss three metrics other than
the position accuracy, that is, energy consumption, time delay
and computational complexity.
In the proposed system, the UEs’ energy consumption is
negligible, because they only need to receive positioning
signals and estimate their own locations. Moreover, GRSs
commonly have the ability to carry enough batteries to support
long-term missions and their energy can be easily replenished
in many ways. On the contrary, UAVs not only need to
transmit signals for self-localization and positioning services,
but also have very limited on-board energy due to size and
weight constraints. Thus, the UAVs’ energy consumption is
the main factor affecting the continuity of positioning services.
The energy consumption of UAVs consists of three parts,
namely the signal transmission energy, the energy for signal
reception and processing, as well as the hovering energy
required for keeping UAVs at the pre-determined locations.
Since previous research has widely accepted the view that
the energy consumption for signal reception is much lower
than for transmission [52], we will simply ignore this energy
consumption in the following analysis. Assuming that the
UAV self-localization has the same period as the position-
ing service, in each positioning period, each UAV needs to
transmit (N − 1) request messages and 2 (N − 1) response
messages through V2V links for self-localization. Moreover,
a frame of positioning signal needs to be broadcast through the
V2U link to support the TDoA positioning service. We also
assume that the transmission of a request/response message
requires the same amount of energy as the broadcast of a
signal frame for the positioning service. Then, for each UAV,
its transmission energy consumption in jamming environments
is (3N − 2) times larger than that in normal environments
where the self-localization can be performed with the on-board
GNSS receiver. So it seems that the operation of UAVs in the
proposed system requires high energy consumption. In fact, as
many existing research pointed out, the energy consumption
of a UAV is actually dominated by its hovering energy [53],
[54]. In addition, as will be introduced in Section IV.E, the
transmission energy consumption can be controlled within an
acceptable range by selecting energy-efficient transmit power
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for UAVs. Therefore, in practical applications, the UAVs’
energy consumption will not be a major issue threatening the
proposed system’s practicability.
Time delay is a metric to measure the real-time performance
of positioning services, and its value is very important for user
experience. As introduced in the previous section, the opera-
tion of the proposed system includes two processes, namely the
UAV self-localization process and the service process. During
the self-localization process, the GRSs first simultaneously
broadcast positioning signals through G2V links to provide
TDOA measurements for UAVs. Since GRSs use pseudo-
random sequences with good cross-correlation properties, the
interference among positioning signals is negligible compared
to jamming. The frame length of positioning signals broadcast
by GRSs is denoted by τS . Then, UAVs utilize the V2V
links to perform DR-TWR measurement in pairs. For now, the
DR-TWR measurements corresponding to different UAV pairs
need to be performed in different time slots. Thus, N (N − 1)
time slots are required to complete the DR-TWR measurement
in the proposed system. As described in Appendix A, the
length of a time slot for DR-TWR measurement can be
approximated as 2τD. Then, the time delay caused by the
UAV self-localization process is 2N (N − 1) τD + τS . After
their time and locations are determined, all UAVs broadcast
positioning signals with frame length of τS at the same time
to provide TDoA positioning services for UEs. Thus, in the
proposed system, the total time delay between UE’s request
and service provision is 2N (N − 1) τD+2τS . It is noteworthy
that the total time delay of positioning services may be very
large as the number of UAVs increases. However, as will be
introduced in section IV, numerical results show that only
six UAVs are needed to provide positioning services with
accuracy better than 20m for UEs in target area with size of
500m × 500m. Therefore, in practical applications, the time
delay of the proposed system is acceptable. Moreover, the time
delay can be reduced by adopting more flexible DR-TWR
protocol that allows multiple DR-TWR measurements to be
performed simultaneously, which will be studied in our future
work.
In terms of the computational complexity, the UAVs’ lo-
cations are estimated with the well-known ML method. In
practical applications, the maximum likelihood estimates can
be obtained with iterative algorithms like Gauss-Newton (GN)
method through a number of iterations [55]. As described at
the end of Section II.A, the total number of measurements used
to estimate the UAVs’ locations is N × (M +N − 2). Then,
in each iteration of the GN method, the Newton step can be
calculated with complexity of O
(
N3(N +M − 2)3
)
. If the
number of iterations required for the GN method to converge
is KML, the total computational complexity of maximum like-













Obviously, the implementation of the ML method is com-
putationally intensive and time-consuming, especially when
the numbers of UAVs and GRSs are very large. Therefore,
in the proposed system, we choose the GRS to perform




Main frequency (fc) 2.4 GHz
Signal bandwidth (B) 10 MHz
Noise power (Pn0 ) -95 dBm
Reference path loss at 1m (β0) 1.01× 104
PLE of G2A channels under LoS conditions (αLG2A) 2
PLE of G2A channels under NLoS conditions (αNG2A) 3.2
PLE of G2G channels under LoS conditions (αLG2G) 2.2
PLE of G2G channels under NLoS conditions (αNG2G) 3.5
Height of the jammer’s antenna (hJ ) 5 m
Transmit power of the jammer (P tJ ) 20 dBm
Radius of the jamming area (RJ ) 2.5 km
Number of GRSs (M ) 6
Height of GRSs’ antenna (hG) 25 m
Transmit power of GRSs (P tG) 35 dBm
Number of UAV (N ) 6
UAV altitude (hV ) 100 m
Transmit power of UAVs (P tV ) 30 dBm
Height of the UE’s antenna (hU ) 1.5 m
Side length of the target area (LT ) 500 m
with sufficient computation power, the complexity of the ML
method is actually acceptable. In addition, the problem of
high computational complexity can be solved by replacing the
ML method with some low-complexity methods. Since the
development of novel estimation methods goes beyond the
scope of this article, we will study this issue in our future
work. In terms of the ILS method for UE location estimation,
it has already been used by GNSS receivers and cell phones for
decades. Therefore, the implementation of the ILS method is
an easy task for users’ handheld devices, so its computational
complexity is not analyzed in this article. Based on the above
analysis, we believe that the computational complexity of
location estimation methods will not threaten the proposed
system’s practicability in real-world applications.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, a series of simulation experiments are
conducted to evaluate the performance of the proposed system
under jamming attacks, and the corresponding numerical re-
sults are presented to verify its feasibility and validity. First, we
test and compare the position accuracy of the proposed UAV-
assisted system and the conventional terrestrial positioning
system using only GRSs in a typical jamming scenario. Then,
the key factors affecting the anti-jamming performance of our
system and their influence on position accuracy are analyzed
in detail through several experiments. Table I summarizes the
key simulation parameters used in this section.
Fig. 4 shows the jamming scenario for performance eval-
uation in this section, which consists of 6 GRSs, 6 UAVs
and a jammer. The location of the jammer is set as the

































Fig. 4. Typical jamming scenario for numerical evaluation.
origin of coordinates, that is, w = [0, 0]T . GRSs are located
on the boundary of the jamming area, and the difference
between the azimuth angles of two adjacent GRSs is 20
degree. The horizontal coordinates of the 6 UAVs are set
to v∗1 = [1350,−400]
T , v∗2 = [950, 0]
T , v∗3 = [550,−400]
T ,
v∗4 =[550, 400]
T , v∗5 =[1750, 0]
T and v∗6 =[1350, 400]
T . The
J2V links between UAVs and the jammer are dominated by
LoS components. The target area where UEs are located is a
square with center at oT = [950, 0]
T and side length of 500m.
During the simulation, the target area will be discretized into
a series of sample points with an interval of 10m, and the
position accuracy at each sample point would be calculated
and recorded for performance evaluation.
A. Feasibility and Validity of the Proposed System
With the expressions derived in Section III, we calculate
the theoretical RMSE of UE position estimate of the pro-
posed system in the jamming scenario mentioned above, and
compare it with the conventional terrestrial system using only
GRSs. For the conventional system, we assume that there are
LoS paths between GRSs and UEs. The evaluation results of
the two systems are shown in Fig. 5. Comparing the “heat
maps” shown in Fig. 5(a) and (b), it can be found that the
maximum RMSE of the proposed system in the target area is
17.7m, which is 64.2% lower than the value of 49.4m for the
conventional system.
Moreover, in Fig. 5(c) and (d), we further analyze the
RMSE distribution and service coverage rate of the two
systems in the target area. As can be seen from Fig. 5(c), the
conventional system’s RMSE at most sample points is between
20m and 50m, much larger than the maximum RMSE of the
proposed system. Only at a few locations is the RMSE of the
conventional system less than 20m, which is comparable to the
proposed system’s performance. The “service coverage rate”
in Fig. 5(d) reflects the proportion of the areas with RMSE
less than a certain value in the entire target area. For example,
the conventional system’s RMSE corresponding to the 90%
coverage rate is 42.5m, which can be interpreted as: when
using the conventional system, the positioning service with
RMSE less than 42.5m could cover 90% of the target area.
As can be seen from Fig. 5(d), the proposed system’s 60% and
90% coverage RMSE is 14.9m and 18.5m, much smaller than
(d)(c)
























































































of UE posit on estimate ( ) f E position estimate
Fig. 5. Feasibility and performance of the proposed system: (a) UE position
RMSE of the conventional (G2U LoS links exist) and (b) the proposed
systems, (c) RMSE distributions and (d) service coverage of the two systems.
the values of 29.7m and 42.5m for the conventional system.
Therefore, it can be concluded from the above analysis that
in jamming environments, the proposed UAV-assisted system
outperforms the conventional terrestrial system in terms of
maximum RMSE, RMSE distribution and service coverage,
which demonstrate the feasibility and validity of our system.
The above evaluation results are quite reasonable. Due to the
existence of the jamming area, the geometry of GRSs is not
favourable for the positioning service, resulting in poor accura-
cy for the conventional terrestrial system. Thus, although their
position and clock uncertainty will introduce additional errors
in UE location estimation, UAVs with satisfactory geometry
could still achieve better performance than the conventional
system. Noted that this simulation experiment is based on
the assumption that the propagation condition of G2U links
is LoS, which may not be true in practice due to the long
distance between GRSs and UEs. When there is no LoS path in
G2U links, the conventional system cannot provide positioning
services, while the proposed system can still work efficiently,
which also reflects the superiority of our system.
B. The Importance of V2V Links in the Proposed System
As described in Section II.A, UAVs in the proposed system
utilize the TDoA measurements from G2V links and the DR-
TWR measurements from V2V links to determine their own
locations. Obviously, the G2V link is indispensable for UAV
self-localization as it provides valuable information about the
UAVs’ absolute locations. In contrast, the role of the V2V
measurement link in the proposed system is less clear. Thus,
in this subsection, we carry out a simulation experiment to
verify the importance of the V2V links.
We first generate a simplified version of the proposed system
by removing all V2V links, and then calculate its theoretical
performance in the target area. The CRLB of the UAV self-
localization without V2V links can be obtained by excluding
the term JDR−TWRV→V in equation (33). Assigning the newly
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X-direction without V2V links
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Fig. 6. Importance of V2V links: (a) UAV position errors under two conditions
(with or without V2V links), (b) UE position RMSE without V2V links, (c)
RMSE distributions and (d) service coverage under two conditions.
calculated CRLB to the matrix Q∆v in equation (59), then
the expressions derived in Section III.B can also be used to
calculate the RMSE of UE position estimate in the simplified
system. The performance evaluation results for this case are
shown in Fig. 6.
It can be seen from Fig. 6(a) that the existence of V2V
links reduces the maximum UAV position error in the x- and
y-directions by 87.4% and 62.0%, respectively. Intuitively, the
reason for the huge improvement in the UAV position accuracy
is that V2V links greatly reduce the impact of the GRSs’
geometry on UAV self-localization. In the absence of V2V
links, most of the GRSs are located on the right side of UAVs
(Fig. 4), resulting in poor geometry of anchor nodes, especially
in the x-direction. With the V2V links, each UAV could be
regarded as an anchor node for other UAVs, which improves
the geometry and leads to satisfactory performance of UAV
self-localization. As shown in Fig. 6(b), the maximum RMSE
of the simplified system in the target area is 76.1m, about
four times larger than the value of 17.7m for the proposed
system (Fig. 5(b)) and even worse than that of the conventional
terrestrial system (Fig. 5(a)). Moreover, it can be seen from
Fig. 6(c) that the RMSE of the proposed system at all sample
points is much smaller than the minimum RMSE of the
simplified system without V2V links. Since the V2V links
greatly reduce the UAV position uncertainty, it is natural that
the UE position accuracy would be improved. In addition,
according to Fig. 6(d), the simplified system’s 60% and 90%
coverage RMSE is 64.7m and 72.3m, which is significantly
worse than that of the proposed system. All of these findings
demonstrate the importance of V2V links in the proposed
UAV-assisted system.
C. The Influence of J2V Links’ Propagation Conditions
Unlike UEs, UAVs with high maneuverability are capable
of changing the propagation conditions of J2V links through
strategies like hiding behind buildings or mountains, so as to
(d)(c)
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RMSE of UE position estimate ) R SE of UE position estimate (m)
Fig. 7. Influence of NLoS propagation in J2V links: (a) UAV position errors
under two conditions (J2V NLoS or LoS), (b) UE position RMSE when the
propagation condition of J2V links is NLoS, (c) RMSE distribution and (d)
service coverage under two conditions.
mitigate the impact of jamming on positioning services. In
order to investigate the influence of J2V links’ propagation
conditions on the proposed system’s performance, we change
the condition to NLoS and repeat the performance evaluation.
The evaluation results are shown in Fig. 7.
It can be seen from Fig. 7(a) that in terms of UAV
self-localization, changing the condition from LoS to NLoS
reduces the maximum position error in x- and y-directions
by 80.0% and 85.7%, respectively. Since the change of the
propagation condition greatly weakens the power of jamming
signals received at UAVs, the reduction of UAV position error
is not surprising. According to Fig. 7(b) and (c), the RMSE
of UE position estimate in the entire target area under NLoS
conditions is less than 4.7m, which is only about half of the
minimum RMSE obtained under LoS conditions. Moreover,
the curves in Fig. 7(d) show that the 60% and 90% coverage
RMSE of the proposed system under NLoS conditions is
3.9m and 5.1m, which meets the requirements of meter-level
positioning services.
The evaluation results in this subsection demonstrate that
the NLoS propagation in J2V links is beneficial for improving
the position accuracy of both the UAV and UE. Therefore,
in practical applications, as long as the positioning services
are not affected, UAVs should flexibly adjust their locations
to avoid LoS paths between them and the jammer.
D. The Influence of GRSs’ Signal-to-Jammer Ratio
In this subsection, a simulation experiment is conducted to
investigate the influence of GRSs’ signal-to-jammer transmit
power ratio (SJR) on the proposed system’s performance.
During the experiment, the transmit power of UAVs and the
jammer is set according to Table I and remains unchanged,
while the GRSs’ power increases from 25 to 45dBm (SJR: 5 to
25dB). We evaluate the performance of the proposed system,
its simplified version without V2V links, and the conventional
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Fig. 8. Influence of GRSs’ Signal-to-Jammer Transmit Power Ratio (SJR) on
(a) UAV and (b) UE positioning performance.
terrestrial system at each SJR. Both the CRLB of UAV self-
localization and RMSE of UE position estimate are calculated.
The simulation results obtained are shown in Fig. 8.
It can be seen that the position accuracy of both the
UAV and UE improves with the increase of the GRSs’ SJR.
As shown in Fig. 8(a), in terms of UAV self-localization,
increasing the SJR from 5 to 10dB reduces the maximum
and mean UAV position errors in the proposed system by
37.4% and 39.6%, respectively. Moreover, as the GRSs’ SJR
exceeds 20dB, the UAV position accuracy of the simplified
system becomes very close to that of the proposed system.
The explanation for this phenomenon is that the SINR of the
V2V links does not change with GRSs’ transmit power, so that
the location information provided by V2V links is negligible
when GRSs’ SJR is extremely high.
According to Fig. 8(b), in terms of the positioning services
provided for UE, as the SJR increases from 5 to 10dB, the 60%
and 90% coverage RMSE of the proposed system is reduced
by 42.4% and 42.5%, respectively. Under the condition of
SJR > 20dB, the RMSE of the conventional system is close to
that of the proposed system. The reason for this phenomenon
is quite similar to that explained in the previous paragraph, that
is, due to their constant transmit power, UAVs no longer have
advantages in anti-jamming after the GRSs’ SJR exceeds a
certain value. Of course, if there is no LoS path between GRSs
and UEs, UAVs would always be the best choice to provide
positioning services for the target area regardless of the GRSs’
SJR. In addition, it can be found in Fig. 8(b) that the reduction
in the proposed system’s RMSE slows down with the increase
of SJR. This is because the UE position error caused by the
noise and jamming in V2U links does not change with GRSs’
SJR. If GRSs further increase their transmit power, the second
term of equation (59) will approach 0, and the RMSE of the
proposed system could be approximately calculated with the
first term P (u∗), indicating that the impact of UAV position
and clock uncertainty on UE position accuracy is negligible.
E. The Influence of UAVs’ Signal-to-Jammer Ratio
Unlike GRSs, UAVs with size and weight constraints com-
monly have very limited on-board energy, so their transmit
power should be chosen carefully. In this subsection, we
analyze the influence of UAVs’ SJR on the proposed system’s
performance and try to find the transmit power that provides
the best balance of position accuracy and energy efficiency.
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Fig. 9. Influence of UAVs’ Signal-to-Jammer Transmit Power Ratio (SJR)
on (a) UAV and (b) UE positioning performance, energy-efficient points for
(c) 60% and (d) 90% service coverage.
During the simulation, the transmit power of GRSs and the
jammer remains constant as shown in Table I, while the
UAVs’ power varies from 20 to 40dBm (SJR: 0 to 20dB). The
performance of the proposed system at each SJR is evaluated
and shown in Fig. 9.
It can be seen from Fig. 9(a) and (b) that increasing the
SJR of UAVs could significantly improve the performance
of the UAV self-localization and UE positioning. According
to Fig. 9(a), when the SJR increased from 5 to 10dB, the
maximum and mean UAV position errors in the proposed
system were reduced by 25.1% and 19.7%, respectively. The
60% and 90% coverage RMSE of the UE position estimate
was reduced by 15.2% and 14.0%, as shown in Fig. 9(b).
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the reductions in the UAV
and UE position errors slow down as the SJR increases. The
explanation for this phenomenon is that the SINR of G2V links
that provide absolute location information for UAVs does not
change with the UAVs’ SJR. Thus, there is an upper limit
to the improvement of the UAV and UE position accuracy
brought about by the increase of SJR. It is unwise to continue
to increase the UAVs’ transmit power while the power of GRSs
remains unchanged.
In order to avoid unnecessary wastage of on-board energy,
we try to find the energy-efficient transmit power for UAVs in
the proposed system. The curves in Fig. 9(c) and (d) show the
RMSE of UE position estimate obtained at different GRSs’
SJR and UAVs’ SJR. Our approach for power selection is as
follows: gradually increase the UAVs’ power from 20dBm. If
the RMSE reduction caused by a further increase of 0.5dBm
in power is less than 0.15m, then the current power is regarded
as an energy-efficient transmit power level for UAVs. The
UAVs’ SJR corresponding to the transmit power selected by
this approach is indicated by the red dots in Fig. 9(c) and
(d). For example, when the SJR of GRSs is 20dB, the UAVs’
energy-efficient power for 60% service coverage is 30.5dBm
(SJR: 10.5dB). The energy-efficient transmit power for 60%


























































Fig. 10. Influence of the number of UAVs on system performance: Scenarios
for (a) 3 UAVs, (b) 4 UAVs, (c) 5 UAVs and (d) 6 UAVs.
and 90% service coverage is slightly different (no more than
1dBm), and can be selected according to mission requirements
in practice.
F. The Influence of the Number of UAVs
In the proposed system, after the self-localization and
synchronization process, UAVs with known locations and
synchronized clocks will be employed as aerial anchor nodes
to provide TDoA positioning services for ground users. Ob-
viously, the number of anchor nodes is one of the key factors
affecting the quality of positioning services. Therefore, in this
subsection, a series of simulation experiments are carried out
to investigate the influence of the number of UAVs on the
proposed system’s performance.
As shown in Fig. 10(a) to (d), we construct four scenarios
with different numbers of UAVs by removing certain UAVs
from the typical jamming scenario shown in Fig. 4. Specifi-
cally, we remove UAV 1, 2 and 6 to construct a scenario with
three UAVs as shown in Fig. 10(a); The four UAV scenario
shown in Fig. 10(b) is constructed by adding UAV 2 to the
above three UAV scenario; In terms of the five UAV scenario,
only UAV 1 is removed, as shown in Fig. 10(c); Finally, the
six UAV scenario shown in Fig. 10(d) is exactly the typical
jamming scenario used in the previous subsections. Please
note that the number of UAVs used in the proposed system
should not be less than three, which is the minimum number
of anchor nodes required for two-dimensional (2-D) TDoA
positioning. To analyze the influence of the number of UAVs
on positioning services, we successively apply the proposed
system to the four scenarios mentioned above, and utilize the
expressions derived in Section III to evaluate its performance
in different scenario. During the simulation, the values of
parameters other than the number of UAVs are set according
to Table I and remain unchanged. The performance evaluation
results obtained are shown in Fig. 11.
It can be seen from Fig. 11(a) that the service coverage of
the proposed system improves significantly with the increase
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Fig. 11. Influence of the number of UAVs on system performance: (a) Service
coverage and (b) 60%(90%) coverage RMSE corresponding to different
numbers of UAVs.
of the number of UAVs. Accordingly, the 60% and 90%
coverage RMSE in the target area decreases as the number of
UAVs increases, as shown in Fig. 11(b). Numerically speaking,
the 60% and 90% coverage RMSE obtained in the five UAV
scenario (green solid line in Fig. 11(a)) is 19.4m and 22.6m,
which is only about 36.4% and 37.4% of the 30.5m and
36.1m obtained in the three UAV scenario (yellow dash line).
Moreover, the average reduction of the 60% and 90% coverage
RMSE brought about by adding one UAV is about 21.2% and
22.1%, respectively. These phenomena indicate that increasing
the number of UAVs used in the proposed system is conducive
to the improvement of positioning performance. In general, six
UAVs are needed to achieve a position accuracy better than
20m. However, it is also observed that the reduction in the
proposed system’s RMSE slows down as the number of UAVs
increases. When there are only three UAVs in the proposed
system, increasing the number of UAVs to four could reduce
the 90% coverage RMSE by 22.1%. If the current number
of UAVs is 5, the reduction of the 90% coverage RMSE
brought about by adding one UAV is only 18.1%. Therefore,
in practical applications, we should not always try to improve
the position accuracy by adding more UAVs, especially when
other factors like safety and cost are taken into consideration.
G. The Influence of UAV Deployment Strategy
In addition to the number of anchors nodes, the geometry
of anchor nodes relative to the user is also a key factor that
could strongly affect the positioning accuracy of a positioning
system. As discussed in subsection A, one of the reasons for
the poor performance of the conventional system is that the
geometry of GRSs is not favorable for the positioning service.
Moreover, the main advantage of the UAVs that are used as
aerial anchor nodes in this article is their fully controllable
mobility and flexible deployment. Thus, in order to improve
the practicability of the proposed system, it is necessary to s-
tudy the influence of UAV deployment on system performance.
Then, in this subsection, several simulation experiments are
conducted to show how the selection of UAVs’ locations
affects the position accuracy.
Similar to the operations performed in the previous sub-
section, we first construct four scenarios corresponding to
different UAV deployment strategies by removing one UAV
from the typical jamming scenario, as shown in Fig. 12(a)
to (d). Specifically, as shown in Fig. 12(a), we remove UAV



























































Fig. 12. Influence of the UAV deployment strategy on system performance:
Scenarios for deployment (a) strategy 1, (b) strategy 2, (c) strategy 3 and (d)
strategy 4.
1 to form deployment strategy 1; Strategy 2 shown in Fig.
12(b) is designed by removing UAV 2 located in the center
of the target area; In strategy 3, UAV 3 is removed, as
shown in Fig. 12(c); Finally, UAV 5 is removed to form
strategy 4 shown in Fig. 12(d). Then, the proposed system
is successively applied to the above four scenarios, and its
performance corresponding to different deployment strategies
is evaluated with the expressions derived in Section III. During
the simulation, the values of parameters other than the number
and locations of UAVs are set according to Table I and
remain constant. The performance evaluation results obtained
are shown in Fig. 13.
The curves in Fig. 13(a) show that the proposed system’s
performance varies greatly among different deployment strate-
gies. Strategy 4 (pink dash-dot line in Fig. 13(a)) exhibits the
best position accuracy, and its corresponding 60% and 90%
coverage RMSE is 16.2m and 18.9m, as shown in Fig. 13(b).
For strategy 4 (blue dash line), its 60% and 90% coverage
RMSE is 16.9m and 19.3m, which is very close to but slightly
worse than that of strategy 2. The reason for the satisfactory
performance of these two strategies is very clear, that is, the
favorable geometry of anchor nodes. As can be seen from
Fig. 12(b) and (d), for any sample point in the target area,
strategy 2 and 4 could ensure that UAVs are approximately
evenly distributed in azimuth, which is generally considered
to be beneficial for positioning service. Compared with the
two strategies mentioned above, the performance of strategy
1 and 3 is quite disappointing. In terms of strategy 3 (green
solid line), it’s 60% coverage RMSE is actually acceptable
(17.7m), while the 90% coverage RMSE is 27.9m, which is
almost 32.3% larger than that of strategy 2. The poor geometry
of UAVs is the cause of this phenomenon. As shown in Fig.
12(c), for those sample points in the lower left corner of the
target area, almost all UAVs are located on their right side,
which commonly leads to large position errors. Finally, the
60% and 90% coverage RMSE of strategy 1 (yellow dash
line) is 19.4m and 22.6m, which is about 16.5% and 16.4%
(a) (b)
SJR of GRSs (dB)
























































Fig. 13. Influence of the UAV deployment strategy on system performance:
(a) Service coverage and (b) 60%(90%) coverage RMSE corresponding to
different UAV deployment strategies.
larger than the 16.2m and 18.9m for strategy 2. The reason
for the poor performance of strategy 1 is quite similar to that
explained in strategy 3.
From the above numerical results and analysis, it can be
concluded that the UAV deployment directly determines the
performance of the proposed system. In addition, adopting
a good deployment strategy (strategy 4) could improve the
position accuracy by about 16%, which is not much different
from the effect brought about by adding one UAV. Therefore,
in practical applications, the optimization of UAV deployment
is also a promising way to improve the performance of the
proposed system, which will be studied in our future work.
V. CONCLUSION
In this article, we presented a novel UAV-assisted anti-
jamming positioning system that could provide services for
users in jamming environments. In the proposed system, mul-
tiple low-altitude UAVs first utilize ground reference stations
to locate themselves, and then act as aerial anchor nodes to
provide positioning services. We determined the structure and
mathematical models of our system, and selected appropriate
methods to support the UAV self-localization and positioning
service. In order to evaluate the proposed system’s theoretical
performance, we further derive the CRLB for UAV self-
localization and the RMSE of UE position estimate in the
presence of jamming. In particular, the UAV position and
clock uncertainty caused by jamming and noise are taken into
account in the above derivation. Numerical results demonstrate
that the proposed system can achieve a theoretical accuracy
better than 20m in typical jamming scenarios, making it a
promising alternative to existing positioning systems. We hope
this article could lead to a new paradigm for the design of anti-
jamming positioning systems.
APPENDIX A
MODEL OF DR-TWR TECHNIQUE
In this appendix, we introduce the DR-TWR protocol used
in V2V links and derive its measurement model (equation (11))
[50]. As shown in Fig. 14, the DR-TWR corresponding to UAV
pair 〈Vn, Vi〉 (i 6= n) begins with a range request message
send by UAV Vn. After detecting the request message, UAV
Vi first waits for τD seconds according to its local clock,
and then sends back two response messages successively at










































Fig. 14. Time diagram of DR-TWR.
an interval of τD seconds. UAV Vn utilizes its local clock
to measure the time interval τ1 between the transmission of
request message (tsVn ) and the reception of the first response
message (tr,1Vn ), as well as τ2 between the receptions of two
response messages (tr,1Vn and
r,2
Vn
). Denote the clock drifts of
UAVs’ local clocks relative to the reference clock as δVn
and δV1 , then the measured time intervals (τ̂1 and τ̂2) can










































are the ToA measurement
errors caused by UAVs’ internal noise and jamming; τf
denotes the time-of-flight (ToF) between these two UAVs.
















Since the values of δVn and δVi are commonly very small
in practice, the above equation can be rewritten as









Therefore, the range measurement obtained by DR-TWR
technique can be expressed as










2 + eVi→Vn,1 −
eVi→Vn,2
2 . Since the
noise terms eVn→Vi , eVi→Vn,1 and eVi→Vn,2 are indepen-
dent of each other, the range measurement error nVn→Vi
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